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Abstract 
Ever since the first popular election of the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, voters are presented with two 
channels to legitimize decision-making within the European Union (EU). In national elections voters authorize 
and hold accountable their national representatives, who represent their interests in the European Council. 
Through EP elections voters elect and hold accountable their European representatives. These two electoral 
channels constitute a system of dual legitimation of EU policy-making. This paper examines the extent to which 
voters actually use both of these channels in order to express their attitudes regarding European integration or 
hold European or national political elites accountable for policies originating from the EU level. Utilizing 
European Election Survey (EES) data from 2004, we show that in some countries, like Denmark and the UK, the 
process of dual legitimation is indeed taking place. In other countries, like Germany and Spain, however, EU 
issue voting is absent from both electoral channels. However, this does not lead to poorer representation of 
citizens in terms of their EU attitudes. Hence, this study has important implications for our understanding of 
how issues regarding European integration affect electoral politics, as well as for the ongoing debate regarding 
legitimacy and accountability in EU politics. 
 
* This paper has been presented at the 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, Italy, 6-8 September 2007, and at 
the IGS Conference, Enschede, The Netherlands, 28 September 2007. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Politicians and social scientists alike have struggled with the question how to ensure that political 
decision-making in the European Union (EU) is democratic. What started off in the 1950s as a 
collaboration between six countries in one particular area of economic policy (coal and steel), has 
developed into an integration process that spans a large range of policy areas: from market 
integration and employment policy to foreign policy and immigration. The recent introduction of a 
single currency in twelve member states is perhaps the clearest example of this development. 
Although it remains to be seen whether in the years to come the EU will develop into a political 
union in which more substantial powers are transferred to the transnational level, the process so far 
has gone far enough to establish a widespread belief that decision-making at the European level 
requires direct legitimation from those who are governed. 
The landmark event for the establishment of a democratic European polity was the 
introduction of popular elections for the European Parliament (EP) in 1979. However, the position of 
the EP in the European institutional troika with Commission and Council has been weak. Despite the 
recent increase in power of the EP, most decisions at the European level are still made without its 
direct consent: under consultation rather than co-decision. Hence, providing EU citizens only with the 
opportunity to voice their opinions in EP elections does not suffice to ensure direct legitimation. 
Currently, this lack of public input in EU decision-making is accounted for by the fact that politicians 
who decide at the EU level are authorized and held accountable at the national level. They are 
authorized by, and held accountable to, national parliaments, which in turn are directly elected. 
Whether this indirect mechanism is adequate in order for the EU to qualify as a “democratic” 
polity, has been topic of extensive debate (Føllesdal, 2006). The skeptical view is captured by the 
notion of the “democratic deficit”, two words that leave little doubt regarding the presumed quality 
of democracy in the EU (Kielmannsegg, 1996; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Schmitt, 2002). Other 
scholars, however, have taken an opposing view arguing that a discussion regarding the democratic 
deficit is redundant. These scholars, for example, show that the relatively new European polity shows 
similar or even identical levels of democracy to those of established liberal democratic states 
(Zweifel, 2000), or argue that democratic legitimation at the European level is not a necessary 
requirement (Majone, 1998) or that this legitimation process in fact functions properly (Moravcsik, 
2002). A third group of authors argues that the EU may not suffer from all the democratic 
insufficiencies for which has been accused, but it does bear one central democratic shortcoming: the 
absence of public contestation for political leadership and over public policy (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006: 
556). 
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Indeed, one of the key arguments in the debate about the democratic deficit has been that in 
European elections voters do not base their choice on opinions about European affairs (see Van der 
Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Instead, national concerns dominate those elections, which consequently 
merely mirror the popularity of national governments. Political parties contribute to this, as they 
focus their campaigns on issues salient in the national realm. Hence, EP elections constitute “second-
order national elections” (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In this paper we would like to broaden the scope 
of this debate by arguing that in order to judge whether the EU lacks democratic quality, one has to 
do more than identifying the impact of opinions about European integration in European elections. 
There are two additional questions that are crucial for the whole debate, but have not yet 
received adequate attention. The first concerns for whom people vote, and, most importantly, why 
they do so. The mere fact that people vote similarly in EP elections as in national elections as such is 
not problematic for European democracy, as long as considerations that are relevant at the European 
level also play a role in elections at the national level. Judging the democratic quality of the EU thus 
requires a simultaneous look at national and European parliamentary elections. Because decision 
making about European integration is primarily in the hands of the national ministers who decide in 
the Council of Ministers and European Council, one could even argue that it makes sense for voters 
to voice their opinions about European integration in national elections rather than in EP elections 
(cf. Mair, 2005). After all, those ministers are not authorized by, and held accountable to, the EP, but 
via their national parliaments. 
The second question concerns how policy preferences about European integration are 
related to ideological divisions in national politics. Even if one would observe that EU attitudes play 
no role in elections – neither national nor European elections – this need as such not even be 
problematic. If disagreement on the future of the European project would parallel disagreements on 
other salient issues in national politics, there will most likely be a match between EU attitudes and 
ideological positions. If voters then base their choices at the polls on a comparison between their 
own ideological position and those of the political parties, congruence between mass opinion and 
elite opinion on EU affairs would be established, even though perhaps not a single voter took EU 
attitudes as such into account. Hence, it is also crucial to determine whether voting on the basis of 
one’s attitudes about European integration would lead to different vote choice than deciding on the 
basis of other considerations, in particular perceived ideological agreement. 
In the following, we first discuss the role of both national as well as EP elections in 
legitimizing political decision making within the EU and its implications for the democratic deficit 
discussion. Next, we identify the ways in which voters should ideally make their choices at the polls – 
in order to guarantee a “truly democratic” European polity. We then analyze to what extent voters 
actually meet these expectations. In doing so, we compare the impact of attitudes towards European 
integration on vote choice in national parliamentary elections to their impact in EP elections, and 
determine whether purely EU-based voting would have resulted in different outcomes. We conclude 
by discussing the implications of our findings for the functioning of democracy in the EU and the 
related debate on the democratic deficit. 
 
 
2 The process of dual legitimation and the democratic deficit 
 
European integration is not an isolated event. The process fits the worldwide development that is 
referred to by terms like “transnationalization” or “globalization”. These developments are 
considered a response to the fact that many of today’s problems cannot be adequately dealt with at 
the level of the nation state. The rise of transnational organizations such as NATO or WTO fits this 
shift to new modes of governance. What distinguishes the EU from almost all other transnational 
organizations, is the way power and decision making are legitimized democratically. No other 
transnational organization has similar structures that allow for, albeit indirect, citizen involvement. 
When the EU is judged in terms of its democratic quality, it should be no surprise that the 
standards used for judgment are those of the kind of polity that does have its powers legitimized 
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through citizen involvement: the nation state. Whether it is appropriate to judge the EU on the basis 
of criteria developed in relation to democracies at the national level, is a matter of ongoing debate 
(see for example Coultrap, 1999; Katz, 2001). However, it is difficult to imagine studying the EU 
without any reference to how national democracies function. At the same time, it is important to 
acknowledge that the EU differs substantially from the nation states it builds on and comprises, and 
thus judge the EU in its own right. 
Legitimation of political power takes place differently in polities at a different scale. Dahl 
(1994) drew a parallel between the transformation from city states to nation states and the 
transformation from nation states to transnational systems. The former transformation was 
accompanied by a shift in the idea about the nature of democracy: whereas in the city state 
democracy was characterized by direct citizen involvement, the transformation to the nation state 
shifted the meaning of democracy by putting central the notion of representation. Similarly, Dahl 
argued, the transformation to transnational political systems may also require re-thinking the 
concept of democracy. The replacement of direct citizen involvement by elected representatives may 
need an equivalent at the transnational level, as the system of representative democracy as we know 
it may no longer be suitable. 
The most thorough answer to this problem in relation to the EU is that of dual legitimation 
(Beetham and Lord, 1998). In this view, transnational political systems like the EU can only be 
democratic if citizens are provided with two channels to control political power: directly elected 
representatives at the European level and processes of authorization, representation, and 
accountability at the national level focused on the behavior of political leaders in transnational 
political structures. This view builds on the presumption that the EU can neither be adequately 
democratized through the intergovernmental approach, nor through the supranational approach. 
The former implies that the EU is basically a collaboration of nation states, and hence democratic 
legitimation depends on ratification of treaties by national parliaments, domestic elections for the 
EP, national allocation of Commissioners and MEPs, and authorization and accountability processes 
between European Council and Council of Ministers and the national parliaments. The supranational 
approach implies that the EU becomes a full-blown democracy in its own right, with an EU-wide 
election of the union’s political leadership, and authorization and accountability processes between 
Commission and EP and between EP and European electorate. Because either approach is 
characterized by severe problems, the only solution seems to be to combine elements of both 
approaches and thus establish a process of dual legitimation (see Beetham and Lord, 1998). 
Beetham and Lord (1998) also emphasized that the presence of democratic procedures, 
which establish processes of authorization, representation, and accountability through both 
channels, is not sufficient. They argue that the EU also needs to deliver, so to speak. This distinction 
between democratic procedures on the one hand, and adequate performance with respect to key 
policies on the other hand, is central in many writings, including Scharpf’s (1999) distinction between 
input legitimacy and output legitimacy. In fact, deciding about the trade-off between citizen 
participation versus system effectiveness may well be the crucial dilemma for those deciding about 
the European integration (Dahl, 1994). The fact that this indeed often does involve a trade-off, is the 
precise reason why the legitimacy problems that the EU faces are considered unsolvable (Höreth, 
1999).  
Indeed, over the past years many authors have claimed that the EU suffers from a so-called 
democratic deficit. The more widespread the use of a particular concept becomes, the less clear its 
meaning. This statement clearly applies to the democratic deficit discussion. Although the term is 
widely used, it is far from clear what it exactly means. Or perhaps one should put it differently: 
because the concept has been so widely used, its exact meaning has blurred over the years. Being 
attentive to political, public, and academic discussions, some scholars have attempted to construct 
what they referred to as the “standard version” of the democratic deficit (Weiler, Haltern, and 
Mayer, 1995). More recently, Føllesdal and Hix (2006) have updated the “standard version” and 
identified five claims made by those who speak about a democratic deficit. These are some of the 
key problems that scholars have identified in the dual legitimation process of the EU. 
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The first claim refers to the fact that the European integration process has supposedly 
increased the power of the executive at the cost of national parliaments (Andersen and Burns, 1996; 
Raunio, 1999). Second, the EP, the only directly elected institution, has a relatively weak position in 
the European institutional configure between Parliament, Commission and Council, because it is 
unable to perform the central function of a parliament, namely controlling the executive and holding 
it accountable (Kielmannsegg, 1996; Schmitt, 2002; Nugent, 2003). Third, even though the powers of 
the EP may have increased in recent years, European elections are primarily “second-order” in 
nature, meaning that national policy concerns dominate and no European-wide political parties 
compete (Reif and Schmitt, 1980, see also Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Schmitt and Thomassen, 
1999; Schmitt, 2002). Fourth, European institutions are seen as “too distant from ordinary European 
citizens” (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006: 536). That is to say, the characteristics of the European polity 
exacerbate the lack of direct input from European citizens. Consider, for example,  the lack of 
transparency of decision-making within the Council (Sbragia, 1992; Wallace and Smith, 1995; 
Nentwich, 1996; Magnette, 2003) or the weakness of an European public sphere (Meyer, 1999; 
Gerhards, 2000, 2001; Downey and Koenig, 2006). Finally, scholars argue that the policies adopted at 
the EU level are not supported by a majority of European citizens (see, for example, Scharpf, 1997, 
1999). The predominantly neo-liberal character of the single market and the monetarist framework 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) seem to have produced a “policy drift” from voters’ 
preferences, who on average are more in favor of a stronger regulated and social Europe (Hix, 1999; 
Hooghe, 2003, see also Schäfer, 2006a, 2006b). The “no” vote in the French and Dutch referendums 
fits this last claim. If national elections are not fought on European affairs, there is no guarantee that 
decisions made by European policy makers reflect the majority opinion. If particular decisions, such 
as the approval of the Constitutional Treaty, are then subjected to a referendum, it should be no 
surprise that the outcome will not always be positive (Aarts and Van der Kolk, 2006). 
Several scholars have questioned these claims (Majone, 1996; Moravcsik, 2002; Zweifel, 
2002). Arguably, Majone (1998) went furthest, arguing that decisions made within the EU do not 
need democratic legitimation. His starting point is the observation that the kind of policies adopted 
at the transnational level are those that are rather “apolitical” in which citizens are hardly interested 
and which are often beyond direct governmental control at the national level (see also Moravcsik, 
2002). In this view, democratic legitimation by citizen participation would only become normatively 
justified if value-laden decisions would be taken at the European level. But precisely because there is 
no support among the European electorates for the transfer of such powers to the EU, this transfer 
has not taken place. Consequently, Majone argues, there is no need to arrange citizen involvement, 
directly or indirectly, to legitimize policy making in the EU at the present time. 
A second objection to the notion of the democratic deficit is put forward by scholars who do 
think that citizen participation is crucial and that checks and balances are necessary, but who argue 
that the current institutional structure at the European level provides sufficient opportunities and 
safeguards. The basic argument here is that the intergovernmental processes by itself, but certainly 
in combination with a directly elected Parliament that has substantial rights when it comes to the 
selection of the European Commission, suffice for considering the EU democratic. Or put in the 
words of Moravcsik: “Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national 
governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU 
policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the 
demands of European citizens” (2002: 605). In as far as there are deficiencies, he argues, these are 
not more severe than in any other national democratic system. 
The arguments put forward by Moravcsik (2002) combine two approaches: comparing the 
practice of EU politics to democratic ideals as well as to the practice of democratic politics within 
nation states. A similar approach was adopted by Zweifel (2002), who examined whether the EU 
fulfilled criteria put forward by a range of scholars as definition of democracy. Zweifel (2002: 816-7) 
uses several established scales of democracy measurement, such as Freedom House, to demonstrate 
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that the relatively new European polity shows similar levels of democracy to the United States and 
Switzerland, which are considered respectable democracies. 
 
 
3 The ideal and actual role of voters in the EU 
 
What becomes clear from our discussion of the process of dual legitimation in the EU and the 
presumed democratic deficit of EU politics, is that the democratic quality of the EU polity is 
debatable. Nonetheless, many political scientists studying EU politics would agree that there should 
be some sort of mechanism in order to enable public input in policy-making at the EU level. The 
elections to the EP are the most straightforward mechanism in order to ensure this public scrutiny. 
However, these elections do not always serve their democratic objective as they are dominated by 
national concerns. Indeed, researchers have put forward a rather skeptical view of the input of voters 
in EU affairs. Franklin, Van der Eijk and others argued that European politics is in a “crisis of 
legitimacy” (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996: 3). In their view, the origins of the democratic deficit at 
the EU level stem not so much from the weak institutional position of the EP, but rather from the 
inability of EP elections to perform its basic democratic function: the EP lacks a mandate to use its 
power. EP elections “are fought primarily on the basis of national political concerns, rather than on 
problems relevant to the European arena” (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996: 7).  
One could argue, however, that, neither the mere fact that people vote similarly in EP 
elections as in national elections, nor the fact that votes in EP elections are based on attitudes 
dominant in national politics, need to be problematic as such. There are two scenarios in which those 
situations would not automatically lead to deficiencies in the democratic character of the EU. First, if 
considerations that are relevant at the European level also play a role in elections at the national 
level, voting similarly in EP elections as in national elections would not be problematic from a 
normative perspective. At present, it may even prove more effective for voters seeking a voice in the 
integration process to do so via national elections, as these elections provide them with the 
opportunity to authorize and hold accountable their national representatives, who in turn shape the 
course of integration in the Council of Ministers and the European Council (Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 
2007). Hence, as long as voters base their choices in national elections on their opinions about 
European integration, there is little need to also do so in the context of EP elections. In brief, the 
crucial question is not whether opinions about European integration are voiced in EP elections, but 
whether they are voiced in national elections. And if differences in the impact of EU attitudes 
between both types of elections can be observed, democracy in the EU would be best served if their 
impact was largest in national rather than EP elections. 
The second situation in which the presumed deficiencies may not be as problematic as often 
argued, has to do with the way in which attitudes about European integration correlate with 
ideological divisions, cleavage structures, and policy preferences with respect to other salient issues. 
Consider the following example. If all British voters would base their vote choice in all elections on 
their own social class position and the extent to which competing parties serve the interests of their 
class, and if opinions about European integration would strongly correlate with their social class 
position (e.g., lower class voters and parties opposing and middle class voters and parties supporting 
European integration), then there is no reason for British voters to base their electoral choices on 
their EU opinions. In this case, the EU issue adds no additional information to a voter’s choice for a 
particular party. The same logic would apply to the impact of ideology or policy preferences 
concerning other salient issues. 
Hence, in order to judge the extent to which voters can express their positions towards 
Europe and hold European elites accountable, and with that to evaluate the democratic quality of the 
EU, one needs to look at national and EP elections simultaneously. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
identify to what extent opinions about European integration parallel cleavage structures, ideological 
divisions, and salient policy preferences. This paper attempts to tackle both these issues. 
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We assess the democratic quality of European decision-making by taking up the notion of 
dual legitimation as developed by Beetham and Lord (1998). Thus, decision-making in the EU can 
only be democratic if citizens are provided with two channels to control political power: (1) directly 
elected representatives at the European level, and (2) processes of authorization, representation, 
and accountability at the national level focused on the behavior of political leaders in transnational 
political structures. In the EU context, two such pathways exist through which citizens may seek to 
exert influence on EU policy-making and institutions or to control its outputs, namely EP and national 
elections. The EU polity, thus, consists of two “channels of political influence, with two sets of 
delegates who may be mandated, and with two arenas in which politics might be played out” (Mair, 
2007: 8). The interesting question then becomes, if voters actually use both of these channels in 
order to express their attitudes regarding European integration or hold European or national political 
elites accountable for policies originating from the EU level. 
To tackle this issue, this paper compares the extent to which voters utilize their EU 
preferences in national versus EP elections. Before we do so, let us first briefly discuss the 
operationalizations, methods and data used in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
4 Operationalization, data and methods  
 
In order to assess the democratic quality of the EU, we have to analyze the extent to which attitudes 
towards European integration influence vote choice in national elections as well as EP elections. A 
data source that allows such a direct comparison is the European Election Survey (EES). Although this 
survey is aimed at understanding vote choice in EP elections, respondents were also asked about 
their vote preferences in national elections. In this paper we utilize the 2004 EES data. 
Because the ten member states that fairly recently joined the EU have such a different 
position compared to the fifteen older members, we only focus on the latter. More specifically, we 
selected five countries out of the EU-15 that differ in terms of the saliency of the European 
integration issue. Germany and Spain are examples of two countries that have witnessed relatively 
little debate on European integration in national politics. Britain and Denmark take a different 
position, as European integration has been more widely debated in the national political arena of 
those countries. Finally, we included the Netherlands because of its intermediate position: the 
European integration issue appears to have become more salient only recently, when the 
Constitutional Treaty was submitted to a popular vote in a referendum – the negative result has not 
gone unnoticed. 
If one is interested in deviations between vote choice in national elections and EP elections, 
one could compare the way that individuals have voted in both elections. However, such a 
comparison would entail one crucial problem: usually both elections are held at different points in 
time and hence any incongruence between vote choices in both elections need not be a 
consequence of the difference in level (national vs. EU). Since the EES was conducted shortly after 
the 2004 EP elections, in several cases there exists quite a time-lag between the last national 
parliamentary election prior to 2004 and the time-point at which this survey was administered. We 
therefore analyze vote choice in national elections on the basis of another measure, namely a 
question that asks voters shortly after the EP elections how they would vote “if there was a general 
election tomorrow” (in some countries the name of the legislative body was explicitly included in the 
question; e.g., in the Netherlands the “Second Chamber” was mentioned). 
We perform two analyses with two different dependent variables; one estimating a model 
explaining a respondents’ vote preference in national parliamentary elections “tomorrow” and one 
analyzing their vote choice in the 2004 EP elections. We limit our analyses to parties that took part in 
both elections analyzed. This allows for a more fruitful comparison between vote preference in the 
parliamentary elections and voters’ actual choices in the 2004 EP elections, as any incongruence 
observed is then not biased by differences in the supply of alternative parties. In doing so, we for 
example exclude EU single issue parties that only compete in the EP elections, such as the Dutch 
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Europa Transparant headed by “whistleblower” Paul van Buitenen, but also the Movement of June 
and the People’s Movement Against the EU in Denmark for example, which are groupings that 
originally belonged to mainstream Danish parties but compete separately in EP elections. The parties 
included in the analysis are listed in the appendix. 
To analyze EU issue voting in national and EP elections, we employ a conditional logit model 
(CL). All variables were standardized around their respective means. Since our dependent variable is 
categorical in nature, but has multiple values – i.e. vote choice for different parties – we need to 
address several methodological concerns (see Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Agresti, 2002). First, since 
the probability of voting for a party can only vary between 0 and 1, ordinary least squares regression 
analysis is ruled out. The use of an ordered probit or logit model is also not appropriate, as it 
assumes the electoral space to be one-dimensional. Moreover, we use a CL rather than a multinomial 
logit (MNL) model. CL models are more appropriate when modeling electoral behavior in a spatial 
setting since they are based on positions of voters relative to parties rather than focusing solely on 
information about individual voters, as MNL does (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998: 56). One potential 
problem with a conditional logit model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. IIA means that the ratio of the choice probabilities for two alternatives, A and B, is 
independent from all other alternatives in the choice set (see Agresti, 2002). We computed a 
Hausman test statistic for the respective elections, which demonstrated that the IIA assumption 
seems reasonable. All estimations were conducted in STATA version 9. 
We included four types of variables in the model. First, we included two variables to reflect 
the impact of cleavage structures. More specifically, we included a self-classification measure of 
social class and a measure of church attendance as proxy for religiosity. These variables range from a 
minimum value of 1 indicating “lower class” or “go to church every Sunday” to a maximum value of 5 
indicating “upper class” or “never go to church” respectively. Second, we included a measure for 
perceived ideological agreement in terms of the left/right continuum. We simply computed the 
difference between the score individuals assigned to oneself from the scores they awarded each 
party. Third, we included a measure that indicates the voter’s evaluation of the performance of the 
national government. This links up with theories of retrospective voting, as well as with the 
hypothesis that EP elections are second-order national elections in which voters express their 
approval or disapproval of the national government. The survey item asks respondents if they 
“approve or disapprove the government’s record to date” (1 indicates disapproval and 2 indicates 
approval). Note that we have not included measures of partisanship – American readers might be 
surprised about this – because in many European countries it appears virtually impossible to 
disentangle party identification from vote choice, and hence the concept has no value as an 
explanatory variable (Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, in press). 
To examine the extent of EU issue voting, we constructed a EU distance variable that 
indicates voters’ perceived (dis)agreement with political parties on the issue of European integration. 
The variable measures the absolute distance between a respondents’ self- and party placements on 
an EU scale. Respondents were asked to place themselves as well as several political parties on a ten-
point European integration scale, where 1 stands for the process “has already gone to far” and 10 
stands for the process “should be pushed further”. If attitudes on European integration have an 
independent effect on vote choice, the effect of EU issue distance should be negative and significant. 
In other words, an increase in disagreement between a respondent’s EU position and a party’s EU 
position should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of the respondent to vote for the party – a 
process referred to as EU issue voting (De Vries, 2007). 
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5 EU issue voting in national parliamentary elections 
 
Let us start with exploring EU issue voting in national parliamentary elections. After all, the whole 
debate on the democratic deficit builds on the presumption that European integration plays virtually 
no role in national politics. Former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors identified 
this as the major problem, as he argued that “the problem with democracy in the European Union is 
not the insufficient incorporation of national governments into the Union’s political system, but the 
inadequate incorporation of the Union into the domestic politics of member societies” (cited in 
Beetham and Lord, 1998: 70). 
Table 1 to Table 5 show the impact of attitudes regarding European integration, as well as 
the impact of cleavage structure, ideological divisions, and retrospective evaluations of national 
governments. The tables provide two types of estimates: conditional logit regression coefficients and 
odds ratios. The latter allow for more specific interpretations of the results (see Agresti, 2002; Long 
and Freese, 2006). An odds ratio refers to the change in the odds of the outcome for a unit increase 
in the predictor. Note that an odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive relationship, an odds ratio 
smaller than 1 indicates a negative relationship and an odds ratio 1 indicates no relationship. Odds 
ratios can be expressed as percent changes by using the following formula: 100*(odds ratio - 1). 
The models are based on the assumption that effects of ideology and policy preferences are 
uniform across parties: for each party, we expect that as perceived differences with a political party 
in terms of ideology (left/right) or policy preferences (European integration) increase, the chance of 
voting for that party decreases. This is reflected by the fact that a single coefficient represents the 
effect of these factors for all parties. With respect to social class, religion, and government approval, 
on the other hand, we expect different effects across parties. For example, we expect a working class 
self-image to have a positive effect on the chance of voting for some parties (e.g., Labor parties), but 
a negative or no effect with respect to other parties. The same applies to religiosity and incumbent 
approval. This is reflected by the fact that these factors are represented by a separate coefficient for 
each party. 
 
Table 1: Explaining vote choice in national elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Spain (Pseudo R² =.64) 
 ALL PSOE IU 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-1.27* 
(.16) 
.28 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude .27 
(.30) 
1.31 
- - 
Government 
Approval 
- 3.51* 
(.30) 
33.45 
1.25* 
(.25) 
3.49 
Class 
 
- -.29 
(.28) 
.75 
-.06 
(.28) 
.94 
Religiosity 
 
- .73* 
(.28) 
2.07 
.28 
(.28) 
1.33 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Partido Popular (People’s Party-PP) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
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Table 2: Explaining vote choice in national elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Germany (Pseudo R² 
=.13) 
 ALL Rep FDP SPD Bd90/G Linke 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.22* 
(.07) 
.80 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
EU Attitude -.17 
(.16) 
.85 
- - - -  
Government 
Approval 
- -1.20* 
(.30) 
.30 
-.97* 
(.31) 
.38 
-1.89* 
(.28) 
.15 
-1.41* 
(.29) 
.24 
-1.01* 
(.31) 
.36 
Class 
 
- -.27 
(.20) 
.76 
.20 
(.20) 
1.23 
-.20 
(.20) 
.82 
-.09 
(.20) 
.82 
-.40* 
(.20) 
.76 
Religiosity 
 
- .72* 
(.20) 
2.06 
.59* 
(.20) 
1.81 
1.29* 
(.21) 
3.62 
.70* 
(.21) 
2.02 
1.00* 
(.21) 
2.72 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich-Soziale Union –
CDU/CSU) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific variables.* significant at p < .05. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Explaining vote choice in national elections: results of conditional logit analysis, the Netherlands 
(Pseudo R² =.32) 
 ALL VVD LPF CU/SGP CDA D66 GL SP 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-1.10* 
(.09) 
.33 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
    
EU Attitude -.19* 
(.09) 
.83 
- - -     
Government 
Approval 
- 1.87* 
(.24) 
6.49 
.74* 
(.26) 
2.10 
.82* 
(.27) 
2.27 
2.44* 
(.23) 
11.47 
.82* 
(.24) 
2.27 
.41* 
(.24) 
1.51 
.83* 
(.25) 
2.29 
Class 
 
- .85* 
(.22) 
2.33 
.24 
(.22) 
1.27 
.48* 
(.24) 
1.62 
.34 
(.21) 
1.40 
.71* 
(.21) 
2.03 
.46* 
(.19) 
1.58 
.34 
(.22) 
1.40 
Religiosity 
 
- .20 
(.23) 
1.22 
.24 
(.20) 
1.27 
-1.27* 
(.23) 
.29 
-.72* 
(.22) 
.49 
-.28 
(.22) 
.75 
-.17 
(.20) 
.84 
-.11 
(.24) 
.90 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid –PvdA) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
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Table 4: Explaining vote choice in national elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Denmark (Pseudo R² 
=.32) 
 ALL DF V KF RV SF 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.84* 
(.06) 
.43 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude -.31* 
(.06) 
.73 
- - - - - 
Government 
Approval 
- 1.44* 
(.16) 
 4.2
2 
2.84* 
(.15) 
17.12 
1.51* 
(.15) 
4.53 
.72* 
(.12) 
2.05 
.67* 
(.12) 
1.95 
Class 
 
- .19 
(.15) 
1.21 
.55* 
(.14) 
1.74 
.85* 
(.15) 
2.34 
.72* 
(.13) 
2.05 
.47* 
(.12) 
1.59 
Religiosity 
 
- .22 
(.16) 
1.25 
-.06 
(.14) 
.94 
-.04 
(.15) 
.96 
-.05 
(.13) 
.96 
.00 
(.13) 
1.00 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. Social Democracy (Socialdemokratiet-S) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Table 5: Explaining vote choice in national elections: results of conditional logit analysis, United Kingdom 
(Pseudo R² =.23) 
 ALL Con LibDem SNP PC UKiP 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.95* 
(.09) 
.39 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude -.44* 
(.10) 
.64 
- - - - - 
Government 
Approval 
- -2.63* 
(.14) 
.07 
-1.64* 
(.13) 
.19 
-1.08* 
(.13) 
.34 
-1.24* 
(.12) 
.29 
-1.48* 
(.13) 
.23 
Class 
 
- .56* 
(.15) 
1.74 
.27* 
(.16) 
1.32 
.38* 
(.15) 
1.47 
.31* 
(.15) 
1.36 
.34* 
(.15) 
1.41 
Religiosity 
 
- -.19 
(.13) 
.83 
-.18 
(.13) 
.84 
-.28* 
(.13) 
.76 
-.18 
(.13) 
.84 
-.34* 
(.14) 
.71 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Labour Party (Labour-LAB) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific variables.* 
significant at p < .05. 
 
 
The key figures in the tables are those that concern the impact of attitudes about European 
integration. These figures indicate to what extent EU issue voting occurred. The results are mixed. In 
Spain and Germany we find no evidence of EU issue voting in national elections, whereas EU issue 
voting is present in national elections in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Britain. In these countries, 
the EU issue distance variable is both negative and significant, indicating that as the distance 
between a voter and a party on the EU scale increases, the likelihood of that voter voting for this 
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respective party decreases. So in these countries EU issue voting exists independent from traditional 
sources (cleavage structure, ideology, retrospective evaluations) influencing voters’ decisions at the 
ballot box. 
At least as important as the fact that attitudes concerning European integration have an 
impact on vote choice, is how strong their impact is. Particularly relevant is how it compares to the 
impact of ideology and incumbent approval. It should be no surprise that perceived ideological 
differences have a stronger impact on vote choice than EU attitudes (this can be seen in the tables: 
odds ratios for left/right deviate more strongly from 1 than odds ratios for EU attitudes). After all, 
ideological labels like “left” and “right” almost by definition comprise the most important 
disagreements in politics – if they do not, the meaning of those labels presumably shifts (see, for 
example, Rosema, Aarts, and Van der Kolk, in press). Hence, any single issue – whether this is 
European integration or another (domestic) issue – may be expected to have a weaker impact than 
left/right. From the perspective of democratic quality this is not bad, as the left/right continuum may 
be viewed as a shortcut to a much wider range of policies (cf. Downs, 1957). 
Whereas the impact of left/right ideology may be conceived of as serving the future-oriented 
mandate function of elections, the impact of incumbent approval serves the accountability function. 
In elections, voters are expected (in a normative sense) to base their choice, at least partly, on their 
judgment of the incumbent government. This is what we indeed observe in all five countries: the 
impact of incumbent approval clearly exceeds the impact of EU attitudes. So in national elections 
voters indeed express their approval or disapproval of the national government by opting to vote for 
a particular party. 
 
 
6 EU issue voting in EP elections 
 
Before we analyze the extent of EU issue voting in EP elections, let us first explore the extent to 
which voters actually switch their vote preferences when deciding which party to vote for in both 
kinds of elections. Table 6 conveys this information for our five cases, as well as the ten other 
member states of the EU-15. It lists the percentages of voters that prefer to vote for the same party 
in national elections “tomorrow” as just voted for in the EP elections (“stable voters”), as well as the 
percentage of voters that prefer to switch party in a national parliamentary election as compared to 
the 2004 EP elections (“switching voters”). Recall that these percentages are based only on vote 
preferences for parties that compete in both the national and EP elections, and hence we might 
underestimate the differences between national elections and EP elections. 
The table shows that there is extensive variation in the degree to which voters switch parties 
between both electoral channels. In Spain, for example, virtually all voters (97 percent) indicate that 
they would vote for the same party in national elections as they voted for in the 2004 EP elections. 
The situation is starkly different in Sweden and Britain. In these countries almost thirty percent of the 
electorate indicates that they prefer to vote for a different party nationally. Note that the five cases 
we selected – Britain, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain – cover the range of party 
switching between both electoral channels. Spain and Germany showed low levels of switching, 
whereas Britain demonstrated a high percentage of voters that changed their vote preference. The 
percentages in the cases of the Netherlands and Denmark are close to the average level for the EU-
15. 
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Table 6: Discrepancy between vote choice in 2004 EP elections and vote choice in national parliamentary 
elections in the EU-15 
Country Percentage Stable Voters Percentage Changing Voters 
Spain 97.2 2.8 
Greece 93.8 6.2 
Portugal 92.0 8.0 
Germany 91.2 8.8 
Finland 87.8 12.2 
Italy 84.1 15.9 
Average for EU-
15 
83.5 16.5 
Netherlands 82.9 17.1 
Belgium 82.3 17.7 
Austria 81.3 18.7 
Denmark 81.3 18.7 
France 81.1 18.9 
Ireland 79.3 20.7 
Luxembourg 75.6 24.4 
Sweden 71.4 28.6 
Britain 71.5 28.5 
Note: Stable voters indicate the percentage of voters that prefer to vote the same party as in national 
parliamentary elections as in the 2004 EP elections; changing voters indicate the percentage of voters that 
prefer to vote for a different party in national parliamentary elections compared to the 2004 EP elections. 
 
In the next step, we analyze the extent to which voters form vote preferences on the basis of 
their EU attitudes in the European realm. We perform similar conditional logit regressions as above, 
but now attempting to explain vote preferences in the 2004 EP elections. The results are presented 
in Table 7 to Table 11. The first observation is that in Spain and Germany EU issue voting does not 
occur in EP elections either, whereas in the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain EU attitudes do have 
an impact. The comparison of EU issue voting in the national and European electoral channel among 
these five different cases shows that if EU issue voting exists in a country, it exists in both electoral 
channels. In other words, if the EU issue influences electoral and party politics, it does so at the 
national as well as the European level. Although some scholars have argued that there may be 
possibilities for national elites to either contain the EU issue to the European level or depoliticize the 
issue within the national arena (Worre, 1996; Mair, 2000), these results show a different pattern, at 
least for 2004. 
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Table 7: Explaining vote choice in EP elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Spain (Pseudo R² =.68) 
 ALL PSOE IU 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-1.62* 
(.22) 
.20 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude .06 
(.04) 
1.06 
- - 
Government 
Approval 
- 3.82* 
(.42) 
45.60 
1.48 
(.37 
4.39 
Class 
 
- .28 
(.39) 
1.33 
.18 
(.39) 
1.20 
Religiosity 
 
- 1.17* 
(.37) 
3.23 
.76* 
(.37) 
2.15 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Partido Popular (People’s Party-PP) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Table 8: Explaining vote choice in EP elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Germany (Pseudo R² =.16) 
 ALL Rep FDP SPD Bd90/G Linke 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.25* 
(.09) 
.78 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
EU Attitude -.20 
(.20) 
.82 
- - - -  
Government 
Approval 
- -1.13* 
(.35) 
.32 
-.89* 
(.34) 
.41 
-1.89* 
(.33) 
.15 
-1.48* 
(.33) 
.23 
-.92* 
(.37) 
.40 
Class 
 
- -.32 
(.25) 
.73 
.34 
(.26) 
1.40 
-.61* 
(.25) 
.54 
-.27 
(.26) 
.76 
-.43* 
(.25) 
.65 
Religiosity 
 
- .95* 
(.25) 
2.58 
.94* 
(.26) 
2.56 
1.39* 
(.26) 
4.02 
.74* 
(.25) 
2.08 
1.14* 
(.27) 
3.12 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich-Soziale Union –
CDU/CSU) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific variables.* significant at p < .05. 
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Table 9: Explaining vote choice in EP elections: results of conditional logit analysis, the Netherlands (Pseudo R² 
=.32) 
 ALL VVD LPF CU/SGP CDA D66 GL SP 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.84* 
(.09) 
.43 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
    
EU Attitude -.28* 
(.11) 
.76 
- - -     
Government 
Approval 
- 2.31* 
(.27) 
10.07 
1.11* 
(.31) 
3.03 
1.36* 
(.29) 
3.90 
2.82* 
(.26) 
16.78 
1.40* 
(.29) 
4.06 
.88* 
(.28) 
2.41 
.58* 
(.32) 
1.79 
Class 
 
- .49* 
(.27) 
1.63 
.19 
(.27) 
1.21 
.07 
(.26) 
1.07 
.41* 
(.25) 
1.51 
.53* 
(.26) 
1.70 
.74* 
(.23) 
2.10 
-.08 
(.25) 
.92 
Religiosity 
 
- .17 
(.26) 
1.18 
-.01 
(.28) 
.99 
-1.43* 
(.25) 
.24 
-.69* 
(.25) 
.50 
-.14 
(.26) 
.87 
-.28 
(.23) 
.76 
-.18 
(.26) 
.84 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid –PvdA) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Table 10: Explaining vote choice in EP elections: results of conditional logit analysis, Denmark (Pseudo R² =.26) 
 ALL DF V KF RV SF 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.77* 
(.07) 
.46 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude -.39* 
(.07) 
.67 
- - - - - 
Government 
Approval 
- .87* 
(.18) 
2.39 
1.89* 
(.17) 
6.62 
1.19* 
(.16) 
3.29 
.65* 
(.14) 
1.92 
.46* 
(.14) 
1.58 
Class 
 
- .42* 
(.17) 
1.53 
.83* 
(.16) 
2.29 
.82* 
(.15) 
2.26 
.68* 
(.14) 
1.97 
.34* 
(.14) 
1.41 
Religiosity 
 
- .08 
(.18) 
1.08 
-.16 
(.16) 
.85 
-.03 
(.17) 
.97 
-.11 
(.15) 
.89 
.15 
(.15) 
1.17 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. Social Democracy (Socialdemokratiet-S) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific 
variables.* significant at p < .05. 
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Table 11: Explaining vote choice in EP elections: results of conditional logit analysis, United Kingdom (Pseudo R² 
=.19) 
 ALL Con LibDem SNP PC UKiP 
 
Left/Right 
 
 
-.50* 
(.11) 
.61 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
EU Attitude -.55* 
(.13) 
.58 
- - - - - 
Government 
Approval 
- -2.09* 
(.18) 
.12 
-1.44* 
(.16) 
.24 
-.96* 
(.15) 
.38 
-1.17* 
(.15) 
.31 
-2.29* 
(.18) 
.10 
Class 
 
- .73* 
(.19) 
2.07 
.38* 
(.20) 
1.46 
.37* 
(.19) 
1.45 
.38* 
(.20) 
1.46 
.62* 
(.20) 
1.86 
Religiosity 
 
- -.19 
(.17) 
.82 
-.02 
(.16) 
.98 
-.35* 
(.17) 
.71 
-.29* 
(.17) 
.74 
-.62* 
(.17) 
.54 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses as well as 
odds ratios. The Labour Party (Labour-LAB) is the omitted reference group for individual-specific variables.* 
significant at p < .05. 
 
A close inspection of the odds ratios for the EU distance variable reveals that the extent of 
EU issue voting in EP elections is of a similar magnitude as in national elections, or slightly higher. In 
case of the Netherlands, for example, the percentage by which the odds of voting for a party in the 
EP elections change for a unit increase in EU issue distance amounts to –24%, while it is –17% for 
vote preferences in the national context. Similarly, in Denmark the change in the odds of voting for a 
party for a unit increase in EU issue distance amounts to –33% in EP elections and –27% in the 
national context, whereas the corresponding figures for Britain are –42% in EP elections and –36% in 
national elections. In brief, in EP elections voters’ attitudes concerning European integration have a 
slightly stronger impact in EP elections as compared to national parliamentary elections. 
Let us now shift to the impact of approval of the national government on vote choice in the 
2004 EP elections. The idea that EP elections constitute second order national elections entails that 
even though national governmental power is not at stake in EP elections, voters still base their choice 
on their approval of the national government. The figures indicate that in Spain and Germany the 
impact of government approval in EP elections is similar to its impact in national elections. At this 
point in the analysis this comes as no surprise, as we showed above that in these countries voters 
seldom switch parties between both kinds of elections. This means that the effects of particular 
factors will by definition be virtually identical. 
The more interesting cases are the three countries in which vote switching occurred more 
frequently. Here we see unanticipated differences. Denmark and Britain show the pattern one might 
expect. Albeit incumbent approval affects the probability of voting for each party in the EP elections, 
its effect is somewhat weaker than in national elections (odds ratios deviate less strongly from 1 in 
EP elections as compared to national elections). For example, in Britain approval of the (Labour) 
government results in much smaller chances to vote for the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats, but 
in the EP election this effects is somewhat smaller than in national elections (the only exception is 
the UK Independence Party). In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the pattern is reversed. The 
impact of government approval is stronger in EP elections than in national elections. This is what one 
would expect if EP elections serve as a means to express discontent with the government, but then in 
a sense enables voters to go back to the government party. The 2004 EP elections in the Netherlands 
appear to have been truly second-order national elections. 
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7 Representation and European integration 
 
A key function of elections is to ensure congruence between the policy preferences of those who are 
governed and those who govern (Powell, 2000). If citizens would strongly base their vote choice on 
their opinions concerning European integration, it is fairly likely that the decisions of the European 
political elite match the desires of their electorates. The analyses presented above, however, indicate 
that in some countries attitudes concerning European integration have no effect at all, whereas in 
other countries its effect is fairly modest. The question rises whether this means that democracy is 
poorly served by those elections, at least as far as the crucial issue of European integration is 
concerned. In the introduction of this paper, we argued that is not necessarily the case. It will depend 
on the way attitudes about European integration are related to the factors that do influence vote 
choice strongly, in particular cleavage structures and ideological divisions. 
There are different ways to examine this matter. One straightforward option would be to just 
analyze the relationship between cleavage structure and ideological divisions on the one hand, and 
positions regarding the issue of European integration on the other hand. An alternative method, 
which we employ here, is to focus not on the determinants of vote choice, but on their effects. More 
specifically, the question we address next is whether the votes that citizens cast serve their policy 
preferences regarding European integration. We analyze this by determining which party voters 
perceived as having the most similar views with respect to European integration, and comparing this 
with their actual vote choice. In other words, we test to what extent citizens vote preferences 
conform to the “smallest distance hypothesis” applied to the European integration issue (cf. Downs, 
1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984). We perform this analysis for both national elections and EP 
elections. 
Our analysis presented above indicates that European integration had no impact on vote 
choice in Spain and Germany, whereas it had in the three other countries. Hence, one might expect 
that Spanish and German citizens vote for parties that hold similar views on European integration 
less often than those in the three other countries. This, however, appears not to be the case. In fact, 
Spanish voters were much more likely to vote for the party they perceived as closest to them on the 
issue of European integration than voters in the four other countries (see Table 12). Among the 
latter, the differences are very limited: roughly half of the voters met the expectations of the 
smallest distance hypothesis applied to European integration. The deviating Spanish figures result in 
part from its party system (and therefore only three parties in the model, which means that the party 
voted for has by definition a better chance of being closest than in a model with more parties, like 
the other countries). 
There are some differences between national elections and EP elections, but these are 
limited. The fact that opinions about European integration were given slightly more weight in EP 
elections than in national elections, is reflected in the figures in Table 12. In EP elections vote 
preferences link up with perceived agreement on the European integration issue slightly better. 
When judging these figures, the glass can be considered either half empty or half full. To 
meaningfully interpret these figures, it is useful to compare them to the extent to which vote choice 
matches perceived ideological agreement, as left/right ideology is considered the most important 
factor (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Analyses presented elsewhere (Rosema, in press) indicate 
that in Spain 72 per cent of all voters cast their EP vote in line with the smallest distance hypothesis 
applied to left/right ideology. Across the other four countries the figure varied between 50 per cent 
(Denmark) and 62 per cent (Britain), resulting in a mean score for these five countries of 60 per cent. 
The difference with the figure for European integration is so small (57 per cent in EP elections), that 
there seems little reason to be specifically worried about representation in terms of the European 
integration issue. If there is a problem regarding representation, it is as severe for the ideological 
positions as for the European integration issue. 
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Table 12: Percentage of voters whose vote preferences are in line with the “smallest distance hypothesis” 
applied to European integration. 
  
National Elections 
 
 
EP Elections 
 
Spain 
 
76% 
(525) 
 
74% 
(389) 
 
Germany 
 
48% 
(354) 
 
55% 
(221) 
 
Netherlands 
 
47% 
(428) 
 
52% 
(629) 
 
Denmark 
 
47% 
(877) 
 
50% 
(619) 
 
Britain 
 
50% 
(959) 
 
52% 
(591) 
 
average 
 
 
54% 
 
 
57% 
 
Notes: Table entries are percentage of voters who perceive the party they preferred to vote for as closest to 
them regarding stands on the issue of European integration. Number of observations are in parentheses. The 
Conservative People’s Party (Denmark) has been excluded, because data on perceptions of its issue stands are 
not available. Perceived issue positions of German CDU/CSU voters concern CDU; perceived issue positions of 
Dutch CU/SGP voters concern CU. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
In the debate about the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union elections play a crucial 
role. Indeed, the choices that voters make have important implications for the functioning of 
democracy. Elections enable citizens to select politicians and parties that hold similar views and also 
to hold them accountable. If voters base their choice on their judgment of the performance in office 
of those who governed, as well as on their judgment of politicians plans for the future, the functions 
of elections are well served. It has been argued that in the European Union these mechanisms do not 
function properly (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006). One problem is that those who govern, in particular the 
European Commission, are neither authorized through popular contestation, nor held accountable to 
the European electorate or its representatives in the European Parliament. Voters have thus virtually 
no influence on who lead Europe from Brussels. Furthermore, in neither of the two electoral 
channels – EP elections and national elections – public opinion about European integration appears 
to play an important role (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Arguably, the most crucial conclusion 
drawn in electoral research is that EP elections are basically fought and hence determined on the 
basis of national politics rather than European politics. Hence, EP elections are referred to as second-
order national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). 
The key thought underlying much of the debate, seems that in European elections voters 
ought to base their choice on considerations related to EU politics. Hence the preoccupation in the 
literature with EP elections. At least as important, however, is the impact of EU attitudes in national 
elections (De Vries, 2007). After all, national ministers are key actors in EU decision-making in their 
role in the European Council and Council of Ministers. One could even argue that it makes more 
sense for voters to voice their opinions about European integration in the context of national politics, 
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since national ministers are more directly concerned with such policies than the European Parliament 
(cf. Mair, 2005). The key problem for democracy in the EU might well be, as former European 
Commission president Jacques Delors argued, the absence of the EU in domestic politics. Hence, in 
order to assess the democratic quality of the EU it is essential to simultaneously focus on EP elections 
and national elections and determine the impact of attitudes concerning European integration (we 
label this EU issue voting, cf. De Vries, 2007). 
The analysis presented in both national and EP elections shows that both electoral channels 
are used by European voters to express their opinions regarding the European project. If EU issue 
voting exists in a country in the first place, it is likely to impact both national as well as European 
elections. So, at first glance, these findings would qualify the conclusion by Moravcsik (2002) among 
others that the current dual legitimation structure within the EU ensures public legitimation and 
accountability of EU politics. This being said, however, EU issue voting is not uniformly taking place 
across European and national elections within all member states. In Spain and Germany, for example, 
neither channel is used by voters to express their attitudes towards Europe. This may be due to a lack 
of concern for Europe among German and Spanish voters or a lack of conflict regarding the EU 
among German and Spanish political parties (see De Vries, 2007). 
One may be tempted to conclude that if European integration plays no role in elections, the 
democratic quality of the European Union will suffer. This conclusion would only be warranted, 
however, if low salience of European affairs leads to incongruence between elite opinion and mass 
opinion, like became manifest in the French and Dutch ‘No’ vote in referendums on the 
Constitutional Treaty. Our analysis indicates, however, that there is no linear relationship between 
the extent to which EU issue voting takes place and the extent to which voters cast their votes for 
parties that hold similar views regarding European integration. Furthermore, if we compare the 
findings with research on the impact of left/right ideology in EP elections (Rosema, in press), citizens 
are not represented much more poorly in terms of their opinions on European integration as 
compared to left/right ideology. Because opinions about European integration are constrained by 
cleavage structures and ideological positions, voters’ choices at the polls still link up with the ideals 
of representation fairly well. So, the mere fact that in EP elections voters vote similarly as in national 
elections, because they base their EP vote on considerations about domestic politics, does not tell us 
much about the democratic quality of the EU. 
 
 20 
Appendix 
 
Table A: List of parties included in the analysis 
Country Original Name English Name Acronym 
Dansk Folkeparti Danish People’s Party DF 
Venstre Liberals  V 
Konservative Folkeparti Conservative People’s Party  KF 
Radikale Venstre Danish Social Liberal Party RV 
Socialdemokratiet Social Democratic Party  S 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist People’s Party  SF 
Republikaner Republicans Rep 
Christlich Demokratische 
Union / Christlich-Soziale 
Union 
Christian Democratic Union / 
Christian Social Union 
CDU/CSU 
Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party  FDP 
Sozialdemokratissche 
Partei Deutschlands 
Social Democratic Party  SDP 
Bündnis’90/Die Grünen Alliance ‘90/Greens Bd90/G 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
Die Linke / Partei des 
Demokratischen 
Sozialismus 
The Left / Party of German 
Socialism  
Linke 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie 
People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy 
VVD 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn LPF 
Christen Unie / 
Staatskundig 
Gereformeerde Partij 
Christian Union / Reformed 
Political Party 
 
CU/SGP 
 
Christen-Democratisch 
Appèl 
Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 
Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party  PvdA 
Democraten 66 Democrats 66  D66 
Groen Links Green Left  GL 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
Socialistische Partij Socialist Party SP 
Partido Popular People’s Party PP 
Partido Socialista Obero 
Español 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party  
PSOE 
 
Spain 
 
Convergencia I Unió United Left IU 
 Conservative Party CON 
 UK Independence Party UKIP 
 Liberal Democrats  LIB 
 Labour Party LAB 
 Plaid Cymru PC 
 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 Scottish National Party SNP 
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